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Abstract
Following LeRoy and Werner (2001), we propose a deﬁnition of eﬀectively complete
asset markets in a model with multiple goods and multiple periods, and establish the ﬁrst
and second welfare theorems in such markets. As applications of the ﬁrst welfare theorem,
we derive the sunspot irrelevance theorem of Mas-Colell (1992), and extend the no-retrade
theorem of Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) to
the case where the asset prices need not be time-invariant Markov processes.
JEL Classication Codes: D51, D52, D53, D61, D91, G11, G12.
Keywords: Complete markets; eﬀectively complete markets; welfare theorems; sunspot;
Markov environment.
1 Introduction
Asset markets are said to be complete if any pattern of transfers of purchasing power across
time and states can be attained by trading assets. In the case of two consumption periods,
with no uncertainty on the ﬁrst period and S possible states of the world on the second, asset
markets are complete if and only if there are S non-redundant assets. The consequence of
market completeness is that the equilibrium allocations are Pareto-eﬃcient.
In complete asset markets, consumers are guaranteed to be able to attain their optimal
patterns of transfers of purchasing power across time and states, regardless of their utility
function and initial endowments. If we impose some restrictions utility functions and initial
endowments, then we may narrow down a class of candidates for equilibrium asset prices
and hence that for optimal patterns of transfers. It might even be the case that for some
appropriately chosen collection of fewer than S assets, all consumers can attain the patterns
∗I also received helpful comments from seminar participants at Hosei University, especially Midori Hi-
rokawa, Atsushi Kajii, and Nobusumi Sagara. The ﬁnancial assistance from the Grant in Aid for Specially
Promoted Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences for “Economic Analysis on Intergenera-
tional Problems”, and from Inamori Foundation on “Eﬃcient Risk-Sharing: An Application of Finance Theory
to Development Economics”. My email address is hara@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp.
1of transfers that we would ﬁnd optimal should the markets be complete. The equilibrium
allocations would then be Pareto-eﬃcient, as in the case of complete markets.
LeRoy and Werner (2001, Section 16.3) made this observation precise by giving a def-
inition of eﬀectively complete asset markets in a model of a single consumption good and
two consumption periods. They deﬁned asset markets as being eﬀectively complete if every
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be attained through some trades of assets, and proved (Theo-
rem 16.4.1) that the equilibrium allocations are Pareto-eﬃcient in eﬀectively complete asset
markets. They then provided three examples, including one of the so-called two-fund sepa-
ration, for which asset markets are eﬀectively complete, and the equilibrium allocations are
Pareto-eﬃcient and can be easily characterized. These examples shows that the notion of ef-
fectively complete asset market, restrictive as it may seem, deserves special attention thanks
to its applicability to many important economic issues.
In this paper, we extend LeRoy and Werner’s deﬁnition of eﬀectively complete asset mar-
kets to the case of multiple goods and over multiple periods. Although the extension is
straightforward and the class of economies with eﬀectively complete asset markets is small,
it admits a couple of important applications. We then prove that, as in the case of the orig-
inal deﬁnition of LeRoy and Werner (2001), if asset markets are eﬀectively complete, then
every equilibrium allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient. This is the ﬁrst welfare theorem in eﬀectively
complete asset markets. We also establish the second welfare theorem in eﬀectively complete
asset markets.
The ﬁrst application of the ﬁrst welfare theorem in eﬀectively complete asset markets
is the sunspot irrelevance theorem in sunspot economies by Mas-Colell (1992). The second
application is the no-retrade theorem in Markov economies of Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders
(2003) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003). In fact, we extend their theorem to the case where
the asset prices need not be time-invariant Markov processes. Since the ﬁrst welfare theorem
in eﬀectively complete asset markets is the driving force behind these results, and since it owes
much to Mas-Colell (1992) and LeRoy and Werner (2001), the contribution of this paper lies
in showing that the technique by Mas-Colell (1992) and LeRoy and Werner (2001) can used to
extend the no-retrade theorem to the case where the asset prices need not be time-invariant
Markov processes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup for our analysis. Section
3 gives the deﬁnition of eﬀectively complete asset markets and establishes the ﬁrst and second
welfare theorems. Section 4 provides the ﬁrst application of eﬀectively complete asset markets
and proves the sunspot irrelevance theorem. Section 5 provides the second application of
eﬀectively complete asset markets and proves the no-retrade theorem. Section 6 sums up our
analysis and suggests a direction of future research.
22 Setup
There are 1+T periods, t = 0,1,...,T. There are S possible states of the world, s = 1,2,...,S
over the entire time span f0,1,...,Tg. The gradual information revelation concerning the
true state of the world is given by the ﬁltration (F0,F1,...,FT). We assume that F0 =
f∅,f1,2,...,Sgg and FT coincides with the power set of f1,2,...,Sg. Denote by Gt the
partition of f1,2,...,Sg that generates Ft. For each positive integer n, we denote by Xn the
set of all processes of n dimensional vectors over the time span f0,1,...,Tg that are adapted
to the ﬁltration fF0,F1,...,FTg. This is a vector space of dimension n
∑T
t=0 jGtj.
There are L types of physically distinguished perishable goods, ℓ = 1,2,...,L on each
period and state. The number of (types of) contingent commodities is equal to L
∑T
t=0 jGtj.
There are I consumers, i = 1,2,...,I. Their consumption sets are the non-negative
orthant XL
+ of XL, utility functions are Ui : XL




T) 2 XL. We assume that the Ui are continuous and strongly monotone.











if there is no other feasible allocation (x1,x2,...,xI) such that Ui(xi)  Ui(xi
∗) for every i
and Ui(xi) > Ui(xi
∗) for some i.




T) 2 XL. An asset price process is an element of XJ that represents the
transition, expected by all consumers, of asset prices under uncertainty and over time. A spot
price process is an element of XL that represents the transition, expected by all consumers,
of prices for the L goods, for immediate consumption, under uncertainty and over time. A
trading plan is an element of XJ that represents the transition of portfolios of the J assets
under uncertainty and over time.
Suppose consumer i employs a trading plan yi under the asset price process q and a spot




































t−1) for every t  1,
where q = (q0,q1,...,qT) with qt = (q1
t,q2
t,...,qJ








t ) for each t. Then he can ﬁnance any consumption















An allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of trading plans is feasible if
∑
i yi = 0.







∗) of trading plans, an asset price process q, and a spot price
process p is an asset market equilibrium if for every i, (xi,yi) = (xi
∗,yi
∗) maximizes Ui(xi)
under the budget constraint (1) for every t  0.
Since the Ui are strongly monotone, pt is always a strictly positive vector and the weak
inequality in (1) holds as an equality. If L = 1, then, by replacing qt by (1/pt)qt, we can
assume that pt = 1 for every t. This convention will be used throughout Section 5.
Denition 3 Asset markets are complete under the equilibrium asset price process q and
spot price process p if for every zi = (zi
0,zi
1,...zi




t for every t  1.
Consider the special case of T = 1. We can identify the payoﬀ d
j
1 of asset j in period 1






1 ) of S L-dimensional vectors. Similarly, we can identify the
spot price p1 in period 1 with a collection (p1
1,p2
1,...,pS
1) of S L-dimensional vectors. Then
asset markets are complete if and only if for every column vector a = (a1,a2,...,aS) 2 RS,




















 2 RS×J. (2)
This is equivalent to saying that rankD = S. It means that if asset markets are complete,
then J  S, that is, there are at least as many assets as states. In the general case of T  2,
for each t  T   1 and Gt−1 2 Gt−1, let N(t,Gt−1) = jfGt 2 Gt j Gt  Gt−1gj. That is,
N(t,Gt−1) is the number of the elements of partition Gt that include Gt−1. If asset markets
are complete, then J  N(t,Gt−1) for every t and Gt−1. That is, a necessary condition for




where the maximum is taken over all t  T   1 and Gt−1 2 Gt−1.
The following theorem is the well known ﬁrst welfare theorem for the case of complete
asset markets.







∗) of trading plans, an asset price process q, and a spot price process p is an





3 Eﬀective completeness and welfare theorems
We now give the deﬁnition of eﬀectively complete asset markets.
4Denition 4 Asset markets are eﬀectively complete if for every Pareto-eﬃcient allocation
(x1,x2,...,xI) of contingent commodities, there exists a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of








t for every t  1 and yi
0 = yi
1 =  = yi
T−1 for
every i.
According to this deﬁnition, asset markets are eﬀectively complete if every Pareto-eﬃcient
allocation can be attained by trading goods and assets on period 0 but not trading on asset
or spot markets from period 1 onwards. Unlike the notion of completeness, the notion of
eﬀective completeness is independent of asset and spot price processes. As in LeRoy and
Werner (2001, Chapter 16), if T = L = 1, and if asset markets are complete, then they are
















 = rankD = S
and, hence, every feasible allocation of contingent commodities, Pareto-eﬃcient or not, can
be attained by some feasible allocation of assets. Otherwise, then neither completeness nor
eﬀective completeness implies the other.
Elul (1999) took up a problem related to eﬀectively complete asset markets. He clariﬁed
when a contingent-commodity allocation at equilibrium in incomplete markets that happens
to be Pareto-eﬃcient can be attained at equilibrium in complete markets. His analysis is
diﬀerent from ours in that he ﬁrst assumed that the contingent-commodity allocation of an
incomplete-market equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient and then asked whether it can be attained
at some complete-market equilibrium, while we ask under what conditions the contingent-
commodity allocation of an incomplete-market equilibrium is guaranteed to be Pareto-eﬃcient.
His analysis is, therefore, applicable to every equilibrium in asset markets that are eﬀectively
complete.
Below the ﬁrst welfare theorem in eﬀectively complete asset markets. It is because of the
validity of this theorem that we have deﬁned the property stated in Deﬁnition 4 as eﬀective
completeness.







∗) of trading plans, an asset price process q, and a spot price process p is an









∗), an allocation (y1
∗,y2
∗,...,yI
∗) of trading plans, an asset price process q, and a
spot price process p is an asset market equilibrium, and that a feasible contingent-commodity




5As shown in LeRoy and Werner (2001, Proposition 16.3.2), since the consumption sets
are closed and bounded from below and the utility functions are continuous, there is a
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation that is Pareto-superior to (x1
∗,x2
∗,...,xI
∗). Without loss of gen-
erality, therefore, we can assume that (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-eﬃcient. By eﬀective com-
pleteness, there exists a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of trading plans such that for every
i, yi
0 = yi









t for every t  1. Since yi
t   yi
t−1 = 0 for
every t  1, this means that (1) is satisﬁed on each period t  1. Thus, for every i with
Ui(xi) > Ui(xi















For every i with Ui(xi) = Ui(xi






























which is a contradiction. Thus (x1
∗,x2
∗,...,xI
∗) is Pareto-eﬃcient. ///
Although it will not be used in our applications, it is worth mentioning that the second
welfare theorem also holds in eﬀectively complete markets.1
Theorem 3 Suppose that Ui is quasi-concave for every i and that asset markets are eﬀec-
tively complete. Suppose also that a feasible contingent-commodity allocation (x1,x2,...,xI)
is Pareto-eﬃcient. Then there exist a feasible contingent-commodity allocation (ˆ e1, ˆ e2,..., ˆ eI)
satisfying ˆ ei
t = ei
t for every t  1 and i, a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of trading plans,
an asset price process q, and a spot price process p such that the collection of (x1,x2,...,xI),
(y1,y2,...,yI), q, and p is an asset market equilibrium when the initial endowment allocation
is (ˆ e1, ˆ e2,..., ˆ eI).
This theorem states that if asset markets are eﬀectively complete, then every Pareto-eﬃcient
allocation can be attained at equilibrium by some lump-sum transfers of the L contingent
commodities available on period 0, not involving any contingent commodity available from
period 1 onwards.2 Note, indeed, that is since (x1,x2,...,xI) is a feasible allocation of









0. To prove this theorem, it is convenient to use the
concept of a contingent-commodity market equilibrium. Before giving the formal deﬁnition of
1I am grateful to Midori Hirokawa and Atsushi Kajii for suggesting that I check the validity of the second
welfare theorem in eﬀectively complete asset markets.
2In fact, it suﬃces to reallocate any one of the L contingent commodities available on period 0.
6the concept, note that because of adaptedness, each z = (z0,z1,...,zT) 2 Xn can be identiﬁed
with a mapping (t,Gt) 7! zGt
t of
∪T
τ=0 (fτg  Gτ) to Rn, where zGt
t = zs
t for any s 2 Gt.




contingent-commodity price process p is a contingent-commodity market equilibrium if for
every i, xi = xi























, and analogously for ei and p.
Proof of Theorem 3 Let (x1,x2,...,xI) be a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation. Since the Ui
are continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-concave, the standard second welfare theo-
rem implies that there exists a contingent-commodity price process p such that the pair of
(x1,x2,...,xI) and p is a contingent-commodity market equilibrium when the initial endow-



















for every t  0 and j. By eﬀective completeness, there exists a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI)








t for every t  1 and i. Deﬁne a feasible
contingent-commodity allocation (ˆ e1, ˆ e2,..., ˆ eI) by letting, for every i, ˆ ei
t = ei
t for every t  1,
and
p0  ˆ ei











i ˆ ei =
∑
i ei. In the following, we show that the collection of (x1,x2,...,xI), (y1,y2,...,yI),
q, and p is an asset market equilibrium when the initial endowment allocation is (ˆ e1, ˆ e2,..., ˆ eI).
Since the feasibility constraints and the budget constraints are clearly satisﬁed, it remains to
prove that the utility maximization condition is satisﬁed. For this, let (ˆ xi, ˆ yi) satisfy the




















































3The standard second welfare theorem only claims that the pair of (x
1;x
2;:::;x
I) and p is a quasi-
equilibrium. However, since the consumption set is the non-negative orthant X
L
+ and the Ui are strongly









. Applying the method explained in Duﬃe (2001, Section 2.C) to


































0. Hence ˆ xi satisﬁes the budget constraint in the contingent-commodity market equilibrium.
Since xi is a solution to the utility maximization problem in the commodity market equilib-
rium, Ui(xi)  Ui(ˆ xi). For every i, therefore, the utility maximization condition is satisﬁed
by (xi,yi) at the proposed asset market equilibrium. ///
4 Sunspot irrelevance
In this section, we give our ﬁrst application of Theorem 2, the ﬁrst welfare theorem in ef-
fectively complete markets. It is the sunspot-irrelevance theorem of Mas-Colell (1992). The
following analysis is really a recap of his own, as Theorem 2 owes much to Mas-Colell (1992)
(and also LeRoy and Werner (2001)).
Assume that T = 1 and that all consumers hold the same probability measure P. Assume















t ) for each t,4 and ui : RL
+ RL
+ ! R is strictly
concave in the second coordinate. Note that consumption is possible on period 0, as well as
on period 1, unlike the model of Mas-Colell (1992). We also assume that ei




1 =  = eSi
1 , (8)
for every i. Thus the states are irrelevant to utility functions and initial endowments, and
thus called sunspot states. Of course, under standard assumptions, there is an asset market
equilibrium of which the contingent-commodity allocation is sunspot-free. Mas-Colell (1992)
showed that if there are not suﬃciently many assets available for trade, then there may be an
asset market equilibrium of which the contingent-commodity allocation depends on sunspots
and some of its realizations are diﬀerent from any of the sunspot-free equilibrium allocations.
We start with characterizing the Pareto-eﬃcient allocations in this economy. The following
lemma shows that they are sunspot-free.
Lemma 1 If a feasible contingent-commodity allocation (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-eﬃcient,
then xi
1 takes a constant value, that is, x1i
1 = x2i
1 =  = xSi
1 for every i.
4Since x




0 =  = x
Si
0 .
8Proof of Lemma 1 For any feasible allocation (x1,x2,...,xI), deﬁne another allocation
(ˆ x1, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xI) by ˆ xi
0 = xi
0 and ˆ xsi





+, for every i and s.




























by (8). Moreover, (ˆ x1, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xI) is Pareto-superior to (x1,x2,...,xI) unless xi = ˆ xi, that is,
x1i = x2i =  = xSi for every i, by the strict concavity of the ui in the second coordinate.
Therefore, if (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto eﬃcient, then x1i = x2i =  = xSi for every i. ///
Next, we give a suﬃcient condition for asset markets to be eﬀectively complete.
Lemma 2 Asset markets are eﬀectively complete if for every good ℓ there is an asset j such
that for every s,
dsj = (0,...,0, 1     
ℓ−th
,0,...,0) = (ℓ-th unit vector) 2 RL.
This lemma means that asset markets are eﬀectively complete if it is possible to guarantee
receipt of any ﬁxed amount of any good. Thus, asset markets may be eﬀectively complete
with fewer than S assets if L < S.
Proof of Lemma 2 If (x1,x2,...,xI) is an eﬃcient allocation, then, by Lemma 1, for each
i there exists a zi 2 RL such that xsi
1   esi
1 = zi for every s. By assumption, there is a
portfolio ¯ yi = (¯ y1i, ¯ y2i,..., ¯ yJi) 2 RJ such that zi =
∑
j ¯ yjidsj for every s. For each i  2,
deﬁne a trading plan yi = (yi
0,yi
1) by letting yi
t = ¯ yi for each t. Deﬁne y1 =  
∑
i≥2 yi. Then












1 = zi = xsi
1   esi
1 .









































Under the assumption of Lemma 1, asset markets are eﬀectively complete and, by Theorem
2, the equilibrium contingent-commodity allocation are Pareto-eﬃcient and, by Lemma 2,
sunspot-free. We have thereby proved the following theorem of Mas-Colell (1992) via eﬀective
completeness.
9Theorem 4 (Sunspot Irrelevance Theorem of Mas-Colell (1992)) If for every good ℓ
there is an asset j such that d
sj
1 is the ℓ-th unit vector for every s, then every equilibrium
allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient and sunspot-free.
Mas-Colell’s theorem tells us that the equilibrium allocations may be Pareto-eﬃcient even
when asset markets are incomplete. Indeed, if the number J of assets is less than the number
S of sunspot states, then asset markets must necessarily be incomplete but the equilibrium
allocations may be Pareto-eﬃcient. It may even be the case that the J assets turn out to
be redundant under the equilibrium prices, rendering asset markets incomplete regardless of
whether J is larger or smaller than S, and yet the equilibrium allocations are Pareto-eﬃcient.
To see this point more formally, assume that for every j  L, the j-th asset pays out
one unit of good j for sure (that is, for every j  L and s, d
sj
1 coincides with the j-th unit
vector), and that the collection of a feasible contingent-commodity allocation (x1,x2,...,xI),
a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of trading plans, an asset price process q, and a spot
price process p is an asset market equilibrium. Then (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-eﬃcient and
sunspot-free. Deﬁne another spot price process ˆ p = (ˆ p0, ˆ p1) by letting ˆ p0 = p0 and ˆ p1 coincide
with the ﬁrst L coordinates of q0. Then ˆ p1 is sunspot-free. Deﬁne another feasible allocation
(ˆ y1, ˆ y2,..., ˆ yI) of trading plans by letting the ﬁrst L coordinates of ˆ yi
0 coincide with xi
1   ei
1
(which is sunspot-free) and the remaining J L coordinates equal to zero. Then the collection
of (x1,x2,...,xI), (ˆ y1, ˆ y2,..., ˆ yI), q, and ˆ p is an asset market equilibrium. This is because
every sunspot-free consumption plan that can be attained under (q,p) can also be attained
under (q, ˆ p), and vice versa. In this latter equilibrium, the contingent-commodity allocation is
the same as in the original equilibrium, but the rank of D 2 RS×J deﬁned by (2) with p1 = ˆ p1
is equal to one because the d
j
1 and ˆ p1 are sunspot-free. This implies that asset markets are
incomplete as long as S  2 but the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient.
5 No-retrade theorem
Our second application of eﬀectively complete markets is the no-retrade theorem of Judd,
Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
We consider a Markov environment in which there are M states, m = 1,2,...,M, on each
period and a single good in each state. Let ¯ m 2 f1,2,...,Mg be the state on period 0, then
the state space over the entire history is given by S = f¯ mg  MT.5
Deﬁne χ : S  f0,1,...,Tg ! M by χ(s,t) = st, where s = (s0,s1,...,sT) 2 S. Write χt
for χ(,t) : S ! M. Then χt maps each entire history to the state that arises on period t along
the history. The ﬁltration (F1,F2,...,FT) is deﬁned in such a way that for every t, Ft is
generated by the mapping (χ0,χ1,...,χt) : S ! Mt. That is, for every s = (s0,s1,...,sT) 2
S and s′ = (s′
0,s′
1,...,s′
T) 2 S, s and s′ belong to the same element of the partition Gt
corresponding to Ft if and only if st′ = s′
t′ for every t′  t.
5There is a slight abuse of notation, as S is a set in this section, while it used to be a positive integer up to
the previous section. Little confusion will arise from this abuse of notation.
10Assume that L = 1, that is, there is only one good in each state and on each period. We
thus let pt = 1 for every t.
Assume that all consumers hold the same probability measure P and subjective discount













where ui : R+  f1,2,...,Mg ! R and xi = (xi
0,xi
1,...,xi
T). Assume that P(fsg) > 0
for every s. This is equivalent to saying that for every t and (s0,s1,...,st) 2 f¯ mg  Mt,
P
(
fs′ 2 S j s′
t′ = st′ for every t′  tg j fs′ 2 S j s′
t′ = st′ for every t′  t   1g
)
> 0.
Assume that, for the initial endowment process ei = (ei
0,ei
1,...,ei
T) of each consumer i,
each ei
t depends only on st (and not on t), that is, there is a gi : f1,2,...,Mg ! R such that






T) of each asset j,
each d
j
t depends only on st (and not on t), that is, there is an hi : f1,2,...,Mg ! R such
that ej = hj(χ).
This economy is in the Markov environment, as there are M states that recur over time
and the utility functions, initial endowments, and dividend payouts depend only on the state
on the period but not on the state on any earlier period. But, unlike the model of Judd,
Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003), the probability that
state m occurs on period t may depend not only on the state that occurred on period t   1
but also on some earlier periods. Note also that we are assuming that there are only ﬁnitely
many periods, while they assumed that there are inﬁnitely many periods. Finally, all assets in
our model are long lived (traded from period 0 onwards and dividends paid out until period
T), while some assets in their model may be short-lived (traded just once and dividends paid
out only on the next period). We exclude short-lived assets from our model for the sake of
simplicity of exposition.
Just as in the previous section, we start the analysis of the model with characterizing the
Pareto-eﬃcient allocations.
Lemma 3 If an allocation (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-eﬃcient, then for every i, there exists
an fi : f1,2,...,Mg ! R such that xi   ei = fi(χ).
Proof of Lemma 3 Let (x1,x2,...,xI) be a feasible contingent-commodity allocation. For
each m, deﬁne rm =
∑














by letting ˆ xsi
t = ¯ xχ(s,t)i for every s and t. Then the allocation












































































where the weak inequality holds as a strict inequality unless xi = ˆ xi, that is, xsi
t = xs′i
t′ when-
ever χ(s,t) = χ(s′,t′) for every i. Thus (ˆ x1, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xI) is Pareto-superior to (x1,x2,...,xI)
unless xsi
t = xs′i
t′ whenever χ(s,t) = χ(s′,t′) for every i. Therefore, if (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-
eﬃcient, then xsi
t = xs′i
t′ whenever χ(s,t) = χ(s′,t′) for every i. This means that for every
i, there is a ˆ fi : f1,2,...,Mg ! R such that xi = ki(χ). The proof is completed by taking
fi = ˆ fi   gi. ///















Lemma 4 If rankH = M, then asset markets are eﬀectively complete .
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose that (x1,x2,...,xI) is a Pareto-eﬃcient contingent-commodity
allocation. By Lemma 3, for every i, there exists an fi : f1,2,...,Mg ! R such that













Since rankH = M, there exists a bi 2 RJ such that vi = Hbi. For each i  2, deﬁne a trading
12plan yi by letting yi
t = bi for every t. For i = 1, let y1 =
∑
i≥2 yi. Then (y1,y2,...,yI) is a
feasible allocation of trading plans and yi
0 = yi
1 =  = yi
T−1 for every i. For every i  2,
t  1, and s,
xi
t   ei














































To state the no-retrade theorem, we need the following notation. Let q be an equilibrium






t′ for every t′  t. Thus there exists a kj :
∪T
τ=0(f¯ mg  Mτ) ! R such that q
sj
t =













While the matrix H represents the dividends of the J assets on the next period, the matrix
K(s0,s1,...,st−1) represents the total returns to the J assets, inclusive of their prices on the
next period. Asset markets are complete if and only if rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) = M for every
t and (s0,s1,...,st−1). In the model of Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) and Kubler and
Schmedders (2003), since there are inﬁnitely many periods and the transition probabilities
between two states are time-invariant, the asset prices are also time-invariant functions of the
M states, and rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) = rankH = M for every t and (s0,s1,...,st−1). That
is, if rankH = M, then asset markets are complete. In contrast, since asset prices need not
be time-invariant functions of the M states in our model, the condition that rankH = M
does not imply that asset markets are complete. It is for this reason that we need to assume
that rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) = M for every t and (s0,s1,...,st−1) in the second part of our
no-retrade theorem.
Theorem 5 (No-Retrade Theorem) Assume that rankH = M. If the collection of a
feasible contingent-commodity allocation (x1,x2,...,xI), a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI)
of trading plans, and an asset price process q is an asset market equilibrium, then there exists
a feasible allocation (ˆ y1, ˆ y2,..., ˆ yI) of trading plans such that ˆ yi
0 = ˆ yi
1 =  = ˆ yi
T−1 for every i,
and the collection of (x1,x2,...,xI), (ˆ y1, ˆ y2,..., ˆ yI), and q is an asset market equilibrium. If,
in addition, J = M and rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) = M for every t and every (s0,s1,...,st−1),
then yi = ˆ yi and hence yi
0 = yi
1 =  = yi
T−1 for every i.
13This theorem states that if asset markets are eﬀectively complete, then any equilibrium
contingent-commodity allocation can be attained by letting all consumers trade assets once
and for all on period 0, and that if, in addition, markets are complete and the J assets are
not redundant, then all consumers do in fact trade assets once and for all on period 0 at
equilibrium. Since the equilibrium asset price processes need not be time-invariant, the proof
of Theorem 5, which relies on eﬀective completeness, is diﬀerent from that of Judd, Kubler,
and Schmedders (2003) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003), which relies on the stationary
dynamic programming technique.
Proof of Theorem 5 Let the collection of a feasible contingent-commodity allocation
(x1,x2,...,xI), a feasible allocation (y1,y2,...,yI) of trading plans, and an asset price process
q be an asset market equilibrium. By Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, (x1,x2,...,xI) is Pareto-









t for every t  1 and ˆ yi
0 = ˆ yi
1 =  = ˆ yi
T−1 for every i. To show that the









0 for every i. This is a consequence of the absence of arbitrage
opportunities at equilibrium. Indeed, as explained in Duﬃe (2001, Section 2.C), there exists



















































































0 . This completes the proof of the ﬁrst part.
As for the second part, suppose, in addition, that J = M and rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) = M
for every t and every (s0,s1,...,st−1). We prove that yi = ˆ yi by a backward induction





































We deﬁne ˆ yi(s0,s1,...,st) and ˆ ri(s0,s1,...,st) analogously for ˆ yi.
Since pt = 1 for every t and q
j
T = 0 for every j (because, otherwise, there would be
an arbitrage opportunity and the maximization problem would have no solution), (1) with
t = T can be rewritten as vi = Hyi
T−1 = Hˆ yi
T−1. Since rankH = M = J, this means that
yi
T−1 = ˆ yi
T−1. As an induction hypothesis, let t  T   2 and suppose that yi
t+1 = ˆ yi
t+1. Then
(1) can be written as
vi =K(s0,s1,...,st−1)yi(s0,s1,...,st−1)   ri(s0,s1,...,st),
vi =K(s0,s1,...,st−1)ˆ yi(s0,s1,...,st−1)   ˆ ri(s0,s1,...,st),
which is equivalent to
K(s0,s1,...,st−1)yi(s0,s1,...,st−1) =vi + ri(s0,s1,...,st),
K(s0,s1,...,st−1)ˆ yi(s0,s1,...,st−1) =vi + ˆ ri(s0,s1,...,st).
Since K(s0,s1,...,st−1) is an invertible MM matrix and ri(s0,s1,...,st) = ˆ ri(s0,s1,...,st)
by the induction hypothesis, yi(s0,s1,...,st−1) = ˆ yi(s0,s1,...,st−1). Thus yi
t = ˆ yi
t. ///
Since the theorem holds even when rankK(s0,s1,...,st−1) < M as long as rankH = M,
the theorem shows that eﬀective complete asset markets may not be complete.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a deﬁnition of eﬀectively complete asset markets in a model with multiple
goods and multiple periods, and established the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems in such
markets. We have then given two applications of the ﬁrst welfare theorem, the sunspot
irrelevance theorem and the no-retrade theorem. The lesson to be learned from this exercise is
that the equilibrium allocations may well be Pareto-eﬃcient even in incomplete asset markets,
15and eﬀective completeness serves as a suﬃcient condition for this to occur.
The usefulness of the concept of eﬀective completeness hinges on to what extent it is
applicable. We now know ﬁve distinct examples of eﬀectively complete asset markets, of which
three are presented in LeRoy and Werner (2001, Chapter 16) and two in this paper. But the
applicability is severely limited by the fact that it requires every Pareto-eﬃcient allocation to
be attained after the ﬁrst round of asset trades, without using asset or spot markets from the
second round onwards. We should, therefore, ﬁnd a weaker notion of eﬀective completeness
with respect to which the ﬁrst (and, preferably, the second) welfare theorem retains its validity.
This seems to be an important direction of future research.
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